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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
Emerald Nkomo petitions for review of her final order 
of removal. Her petition requires us to decide a question of first 
impression in this Court: whether a notice to appear that fails 
to specify the time and place of an initial removal hearing 
deprives an immigration judge of jurisdiction over the removal 
proceedings. We hold that it does not.  
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Nkomo also seeks review of the denials of her 
application for withholding of removal and her request for 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We 
are unpersuaded by the merits of her withholding claim and we 
lack jurisdiction over her CAT claim. So we will deny Nkomo’s 
petition in part and dismiss it in part. 
I 
A lawful permanent resident of the United States and a 
citizen of Zimbabwe, Nkomo was convicted in 2017 of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1342 and 1349. This conviction is for an “aggravated 
felony,” which makes Nkomo removable and ineligible for 
most relief. About a month after she was sentenced to time 
served for that offense, the Government initiated these removal 
proceedings. 
Adopting much of the Immigration Judge’s analysis, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals found Nkomo ineligible for 
withholding because her wire fraud conviction was for a 
“particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). Although that finding did not foreclose 
CAT protection, the Board denied that too, adopting the IJ’s 
finding that Nkomo had not shown a probability she would be 
tortured by or with the acquiescence of the government of 
Zimbabwe. Nkomo filed this timely petition for review. See 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). 
II 
The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1003.2(c). We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because Nkomo is a criminal alien, our 
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review is limited to colorable legal and constitutional claims. 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D). We review the Board’s decision, 
but where “the BIA adopt[s] and affirm[s] the IJ’s decisions 
and orders as well as [conducting] an independent analysis, we 
review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions and orders.” 
S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 543 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Ordonez-Tevalan v. Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 331, 340–41 
(3d Cir. 2016)). “[W]e look to the IJ’s opinion ‘only where the 
BIA has substantially relied on that opinion.’” Id. (quoting 
Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009), as 
amended (Nov. 4, 2009)).  
III 
We begin with Nkomo’s jurisdictional challenge to the 
immigration proceedings. While her appeal was pending 
before the BIA, Nkomo filed a motion to remand to the IJ, 
claiming that her proceedings should be terminated in light of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 
2105 (2018). Nkomo Br. 21–23, 25. The BIA denied Nkomo’s 
motion to remand, citing its decision in Matter of Bermudez-
Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (BIA 2018). Nkomo claims the 
Board erred in this regard. Because her jurisdictional challenge 
is a purely legal one, our review is plenary. Chiao Fang Ku v. 
Att’y Gen., 912 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2019).  
At issue in Pereira was cancellation of removal, a form 
of discretionary relief available under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). 
To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an alien must accrue 
10 years of continuous physical presence in the United States 
“immediately preceding the date” of the application for 
cancellation. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). That continuous physical 
presence ceases to accrue, however, “when the alien is served 
a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” Id. 
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§ 1229b(d)(1)(A). This is known as the “stop-time rule.” 
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109. Pereira was denied cancellation of 
removal by the agency because he was served with a notice to 
appear before he had accrued the requisite 10 years. Applying 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit denied Pereira’s petition for review. Pereira v. 
Sessions, 866 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2017). 
The Supreme Court reversed. Eschewing Chevron 
deference in favor of the text of the statute, the Court held that 
the notice to appear served on Pereira did not trigger the stop-
time rule because § 1229(a) requires that the notice to appear 
specify, inter alia, “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] 
proceedings will be held.” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i)). The Court reasoned: 
“By expressly referencing § 1229(a), the statute specifies 
where to look to find out what ‘notice to appear’ means.” Id. at 
2114. And looking to § 1229(a), one finds a requirement that 
time and place be specified. The Court explained that “[i]f the 
three words ‘notice to appear’ mean anything in this context, 
they must mean that, at a minimum, the Government has to 
provide noncitizens ‘notice’ of the information, i.e., the ‘time’ 
and ‘place,’ that would enable them ‘to appear’ at the removal 
hearing.” Id. at 2115. Because the notice to appear served on 
Pereira failed to include that information, he was not ineligible 
for cancellation of removal. 
In this case, Nkomo appeared at, and participated in, her 
removal hearing. She nevertheless argues that the IJ, the BIA, 
and this Court all lack jurisdiction because her notice to appear 
was deficient under Pereira. Her argument boils down to the 
following logical sequence: (1) Pereira defined “notice to 
appear” for all purposes; (2) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a) provides 
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that “[j]urisdiction vests, and proceedings before an 
Immigration Judge commence, when a charging document is 
filed with the Immigration Court”; (3) 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13 
defines “charging document” as “the written instrument which 
initiates a proceeding before an Immigration 
Judge . . . . includ[ing] a Notice to Appear”; (4) because a 
notice to appear lacking time and place information is not 
actually a notice to appear under Pereira, it’s not a charging 
document; so (5) jurisdiction never vested when that document 
was filed.  
 The argument Nkomo makes here has been made to 
seven of our sister courts in the past two years and it has been 
rejected each time. See Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 
957–58, 962–64 (7th Cir. 2019); Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 
(8th Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 110–12 
(2d Cir. 2019); Soriano-Mendosa v. Barr, 768 F. App’x 796, 
801–02 (10th Cir. 2019) (non-precedential); Santos-Santos v. 
Barr, 917 F.3d 486, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. 
Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2019); Hernandez-
Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2018); 
Leonard v. Whitaker, 746 F. App’x 269, 269–70 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(non-precedential per curiam); United States v. Perez-Arellano, 
756 F. App’x 291, 294 (4th Cir. 2018) (non-precedential per 
curiam). And, as we noted already, the BIA rejected the 
argument in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 
(BIA 2018). Today we join our sister courts and the BIA for 
three reasons. 
 First, unlike the stop-time rule, which is explicitly tied 
to the list of elements in § 1229(a), see Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 
2114, the jurisdiction-vesting regulation upon which Nkomo 
relies does not cross-reference that section. See Karingithi, 913 
F.3d at 1161 (“Pereira treats this statutory cross-reference as 
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crucial . . . . There is no ‘glue’ to bind § 1229(a) and the 
jurisdictional regulations: the regulations do not reference 
§ 1229(a), which itself makes no mention of the IJ’s 
jurisdiction.”). A critical piece of Pereira’s reasoning is thus 
inapplicable here. And not only is the word “jurisdiction” 
nowhere to be found in § 1229(a), but it also would be an odd 
place to find a jurisdictional limitation. Congress would have 
placed § 1229(a)(1)’s requirements in § 1229a—the section 
establishing the IJ’s authority—if it meant them to limit the IJ’s 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
 Second, Pereira did not purport to resolve issues beyond 
the § 1229b(d)(1)(A) stop-time rule context, and the Supreme 
Court repeatedly emphasized the narrowness of its holding, 
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110, 2113; see id. at 2121 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). That limitation makes sense, and we should 
hesitate to extend Pereira’s reach, because the cancellation of 
removal context at issue in Pereira and the reopening/remand 
context at issue in Nkomo’s case are quite different. Filing a 
notice to appear commences removal proceedings—and 
serving it stops the accrual of time for an alien’s “ten years of 
continuous presence” if it complies with § 1229(a). By 
contrast, reopening and remand are available only when 
proceedings before the IJ have been completed. See Mauricio-
Benitez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 144, 148 n.1 (5th Cir. 2018). So 
while Pereira’s holding expands the class of those eligible for 
discretionary relief in removal proceedings, Nkomo’s 
argument would invalidate scores of removal orders (and, 
presumably, grants of relief). And it would do so without even 
requiring the alien to allege she lacked sufficient notice of her 
hearing, see Hernandez-Perez, 911 F.3d at 314. We doubt the 
Supreme Court made so dramatic a change sub silentio. 
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Third, the majority and dissent in Pereira debated 
whether a notice to appear under § 1229(a) might be 
understood as a charging document rather than a notice focused 
on informing the alien of the time and place of her hearing. See 
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2115 n.7; id. at 2128 & n.6 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). The Court observed that “[e]ven if a notice to 
appear functions as a ‘charging document,’ that is not mutually 
exclusive with the conclusion that a notice to appear serves 
another equally integral function: telling a noncitizen when and 
where to appear.” Id. at 2115 n.7. But the regulation at issue in 
Nkomo’s case explicitly describes the relevant filing as a 
“charging document.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14. This suggests 
§ 1003.14’s filing requirement serves a different purpose than 
the “notice to appear under section 1229(a)” in the stop-time 
rule, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A).  
 Other regulatory provisions likewise confirm that 
Pereira’s holding is not readily transferable to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.14. One rule lists what must be included in a notice to 
appear under § 1003.14, and time and place are conspicuously 
absent. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b), (c). The regulation further 
provides that failure to include the required information “shall 
not be construed as affording the alien any substantive or 
procedural rights.” Id. § 1003.15(c). Nkomo does not argue 
that these provisions are inconsistent with the statute or 
otherwise invalid.  
 We recognize that Pereira’s reasoning at times suggests 
a breadth that is at odds with the Court’s insistence that its 
opinion was addressed to the “narrow question” of the effect of 
a non-compliant notice to appear on § 1229b(d)(1)(A)’s stop-
time rule. See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110 (“A notice that does 
not inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for removal 
proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a)’ 
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and therefore does not trigger the stop-time rule.”). But given 
the distinguishing factors we have noted along with the Court’s 
emphasis on Pereira’s limitations, and the fact that § 1229(a) 
says nothing about jurisdiction—we do not believe Pereira’s 
interpretation of “notice to appear” implicates the IJ’s authority 
to adjudicate. So we reject Nkomo’s jurisdictional challenge.  
IV 
 Having determined that the BIA did not err when it 
denied Nkomo’s motion to remand, we turn to the Board’s 
denial of Nkomo’s application for withholding of removal. She 
argues that the Board erred in deciding as a matter of discretion 
that her conviction for wire fraud was a “particularly serious 
crime” that made her ineligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B).  
It is undisputed that Nkomo’s fraud conviction was for 
an “aggravated felony.” See Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 
105 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Aug. 23, 2006). It is also 
undisputed that Nkomo was not sentenced to at least five years’ 
imprisonment for wire fraud. So her crime is not ipso facto a 
“particularly serious” one, though the Board may yet conclude 
that it is based on its circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B). The Board has broad discretion to make that 
decision. See Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 214 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 Nkomo’s principal argument is that the Board erred in 
failing to address whether she was a danger to the community. 
She cites statutory language that might suggest such a 
requirement. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (barring 
withholding eligibility if the Attorney General determines “the 
alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
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particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the 
United States”). But we need not analyze this argument since 
it is foreclosed by precedent. See Denis, 633 F.3d at 215 n.19 
(“[N]either the IJ nor the BIA, nor we, need opine as to [the 
alien’s] potential danger to the community.” (citing Matter of 
N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (BIA 2007))).   
 Besides the question of danger to the community, 
Nkomo contends the Board erred in failing to take proper 
account of her minimal participation in the fraudulent scheme 
underlying her conviction. Her level of participation, she 
argues, led to a non-custodial sentence that should have been 
taken into account. We have jurisdiction to review claims that 
the Board misapplied its precedents. See Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 
602 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2010). But we see no legal error in 
the Board’s analysis on this point. 
The Board acknowledged Nkomo had been adjudged a 
minimal participant in a much broader fraudulent scheme, but 
agreed with the IJ that the gravity of the offense outweighed 
her lower culpability as compared to her co-conspirators. 
Nkomo participated in a fraudulent scheme totaling $40 
million in losses and she was held personally responsible for 
nearly $3 million. Because financial crimes may be 
“particularly serious,” Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 268, and in light of 
the substantial deference due the Board in this area, we 
perceive no error. Nor does Nkomo point to any Board 
precedent supporting a different result.  
Relying on Matter of Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 
(BIA 1982), Nkomo argues that the Board failed to account for 
the non-custodial sentence she received. It bears noting the 
Board did cite her sentence in its analysis. AR 4. What Nkomo 
seems to suggest is that Board precedent requires consideration 
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of a non-custodial sentence as a mitigating factor. But the 
Board lists the sentence imposed as a factor that “may” be used 
in its determination—and sometimes the Board relies 
exclusively on the elements of the offense. Denis, 633 F.3d at 
215; N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342–43. This approach 
necessarily gives no weight to the sentence imposed. As the 
Board explained in N-A-M-, its “approach to determining 
whether a crime is particularly serious has evolved 
since . . . Matter of Frentescu” and “the sentence imposed is 
not a dominant factor in determining whether a conviction is 
for a particularly serious crime.” Id. In any event, the 
“particularly serious crime” determination lacks “textual or 
contextual indicators in the INA” and is not amenable to bright 
line rules like the one Nkomo seems to propose. Denis, 633 
F.3d at 214. We will therefore deny the petition for review as 
to withholding of removal. 
V 
 Finally, we consider Nkomo’s CAT claim. Nkomo’s 
father was deeply involved with the Zimbabwe African 
People’s Union (ZAPU) party, a onetime rival of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) party. She argues the Board 
erred in relying on the merger of these parties (into the ZANU-
PF party) in finding she would not likely be tortured by or with 
the acquiescence of the government of Zimbabwe. The merger, 
she contends, was “only symbolic in nature,” and she would 
still be in danger as an outsider to Zimbabwe’s dominant 
political party. Nkomo Br. 21. In essence, she takes issue with 
the IJ’s finding that she is unlikely to suffer harm upon return 
because the party that once posed a threat has merged with her 
own. This presents a factual challenge over which we have no 
jurisdiction. See Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (“Because the basis for removal is [the alien’s] 
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conviction for an aggravated felony, our jurisdiction is limited 
under the REAL ID Act to ‘constitutional claims or questions 
of law.’” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–(D))). 
Nkomo also rehashes evidence that she might suffer 
harm upon her return to Zimbabwe, without addressing 
evidence to the contrary relied on by the IJ and the Board. Here 
again, what is likely to happen on Nkomo’s return to 
Zimbabwe (as opposed to whether those predicted events meet 
the legal definitions of “torture” or “acquiescence”) is a factual 
question over which we lack jurisdiction. See Myrie v. Att’y 
Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 516–17 (3d Cir. 2017). So we cannot 
review, much less disturb, the Board’s determination that if 
Nkomo is returned to Zimbabwe, she is not likely to suffer 
harm because her party merged with the party in power, the 
government has not targeted her for three decades, and she has 
previously traveled there without being questioned by the 
government.  
*  *  * 
For these reasons, we will deny Nkomo’s petition for 
review as to withholding of removal and otherwise dismiss it 
for lack of jurisdiction over her claim for protection under the 
Convention Against Torture.  
